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We examine international …scal coordination in a world where markets
are integrated but national governments are sovereign. Consequences of the
liberalization of the capital market on national …scal policies and possible
remedies to resulting ine¢ciencies are analyzed. A simple model, with
N countries where competitive …rms produce an homogeneous good using
mobile capital and immobile labor is considered. Fiscal competition arises
between governments that have to tax capital and labor in order to raise
…xed amount of revenue. It is shown that capital mobility improves the
capital allocation among countries as it enables capital owners to invest
it in the country where capital is scarce. But …scal competition leads to
asymmetric capital taxation among countries and thus to a distortion on
the international capital market.
Two …scal reforms are considered: the introduction of a minimum cap-
ital tax level and the imposition of a tax range, i.e. a minimum plus a
maximum capital tax level.
We show that the minimum tax reform is never prefered to …scal com-
petition by all countries while tax range reforms are unanimously accepted
when it imposes convergence to the extreme taxes and it does not change
the international remuneration of capital.
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The paper tackles the problemof international …scal coordination in a world where
markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. The ongoing
globalization movement allows a superior utilization of resources and a better
allocation of risks among countries. When markets get more liberalized, national
economies become more interdependent. Therefore a government has to take
into account the behavior of its trade partners when undertaking local economic
policies. It is no longer possible to envisage redistributive policies, the production
of public goods or the …scal policy without taking into account its e¤ects on trade
or capital ‡ows. A possible consequence of this international interdependence is
a downward pressure on the size of the public sector (cfr. Cremer and Al. (1996)
for a survey of the literature). This could be viewed as a positive consequence if
we consider the government as a growing and ine¢cient Leviathan and a negative
one if we envisage a benevolent social planner.
In this paper, we consider the consequences on national …scal policies of the
liberalization of the capital market. We consider a simple model, with N countries
where competitive …rms produce a homogeneous good using mobile capital and
immobile labor. Fiscal competition arises between governments that have to tax
capital and labor in order to levy a …xed amount of public money. The capital
tax we consider here, as it concerns productive capital, has to be understood as
a corporate tax1.
We show that capital mobility improves capital allocation among countries as
it enables capital owners to invest in the country where capital is scarce. But
…scal competition leads to asymmetric capital taxation and thus to a distortion
of the international capital market. More precisely, at equilibrium, the more a
country imports capital, the larger its corporate tax. This is because a country
importing capital, by taxing it, has part of its tax burden supported by foreign
capital owners. Moreover, by taxing capital, a country depresses the international
remuneration of capital and therefore decreases the cost it has to incur for the
capital it imports.
The questions raised in this paperare important policy issues. Both the OECD
and the European Commission have advocated …scal harmonization; see OECD
(1991) and the Ruding Report (1992), in reference to production e¢ciency.
The core of this paperistheanalysisof possible remediestotheconsequencesof
…scal competition. We consider two …scal reforms: the introduction of a minimum
capital tax level and the imposition of a tax range, i.e. a minimumand amaximum
capital tax level2.
1This view is shared by most of the literature, see for instance Person and Tabellini (1992).
2The …rst reform has already been used by the European Union to decrease the ine¢ciency
2Taking as decision rule unanimity, we show that the minimum tax reform never
passes and that tax range reforms are unanimously accepted when it imposes
convergence to the extreme of equilibrium taxes.
These reforms have the nice features of being simple, anonymous and of re-
specting the subsidiary principle.3 It is anonymous in that it applies in the same
way to all countries, i.e. it restricts their strategy set and does not assign a par-
ticular tax level to each country. It respects the subsidiary principle in that it
leaves to the national level the …scal decision while the supra-national interven-
tions intend to limit ine¢ciencies.
It is possible to interpret this as an attempt to design supra-national (for
Europe) or federal (for the Australia, Canada or the US) institutions helping to
avoid ine¢ciencies linked to …scal competition. The core of an institution is its
jurisdiction and decision rule. The jurisdiction would be the setting of the tax
range or of the minimum tax level. We have selected unanimity as decision rule
as it is the one used in the European Union on these matters.
Would the model be empirically irrelevant, our policy propositions would be
with little interest. In order to convince us of the empirical relevance of the model,
we computed correlations between statutory corporate tax levels and the extend
of foreign capital ownership for the 14 EU members. This has not to be considered
as a rigorous test because the measurements we use are rough estimations: We
proxy the extend of the foreign ownership of capital in a country by aggregating
its current account balance between 1990 and 1996. We would reject our theory,
if we observed a negative correlation between the statutory corporate tax of each
country and the ratio between our proxy of foreign ownership of capital and the
number of workers. Our sample consists in 14 members of the E U (all except
Luxembourg for which we do not have all data) and our data come from the IMF
(1998) and the KPMG corporate tax survey 1998. We …nd a signi…cant positive
correlation and therefore are not able to reject our theory4.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we place this paper
in the context of the literature on …scal competition. Section 3 describes the
main features of the model. Section 4 is devoted to the description of the agents’
preferences and to the derivation of a non-cooperative equilibrium. In section 5
we study the harmonization procedure and derive the main results. Section 6
discussed extension of the model.
from …scal competition on value added tax.
3The subsidiarity principle states that decisions have to be taken at the lowest e¢cient level
of government (supra national, national or regional).
4To check if the correlation is signi…cant we regress the extend of foreign capital owner-
ship divided by the active population on the statutory corporate tax level and found that this
coe¢cient is signi…cant at .99.
32. Related Literature
Several papers investigate the scope for international income tax coordination.
Some of them consider a …xed international remuneration of capital. Razin and
Sadka (1991) showed that when there is no pure pro…t and all …scal instruments
are available, there is no scope forcoordination as each country usesonly residency
based tax and therefore no international externalities are created by …scal policy.
Huizinga and Nielsen (1996) show that there are cases for coordination when some
pure pro…t exists. They show that coordination is more important when foreign
ownership is developed in each countries.
The largest support for …scal coordination comes from models considering
endogenously determined capital remuneration. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991),
Persson and Tabellini (1992), Lopez, Marchand Pestieau (1996) show that …scal
competition leads to under-provision of public good or ine¢cient redistribution.
Others, like Bucovetsky (1991) and Grazzini and van Ypersele (1996) are con-
cerned about the e¢cient allocation of capital. They therefore consider a …xed
public budget requirement. Both show that there is room for coordination.
This paper belongs to the last category. It di¤ers from the existing litera-
ture in several ways. First, we allow heterogeneity among countries in size of its
population, as in Bucovetsky (1991) and in capital endowment. This leads to
an asymmetric equilibrium to the non-cooperative gave and enables us to tackle
more carefully the problem of ine¢cient allocation of capital. Second, we con-
sider a setting with an arbitrary numbers of countries. It does not add much
to the description of a non-cooperative equilibrium, but provides a richer model
with which to consider the di¤erent potential coordination policies. More impor-
tantly, we propose design for coordination policies in an environment that could
be considered as supranational institutions.
A non negligible aspect of our result, is that, contrary to Bucovetsky and
Wilson (1991), …scal coordination holds even when residence based capital tax is
allowed.
Our model builds on Grazzini and van Ypersele (1996). The …rst part of our
analysis generalizes it by extending the number of countries (from two to N) and
by using a more general production function. It enables us to decompose the
e¤ect of …scal policies on the welfare of each country in a more precise way. The
most interesting innovations lie in the analysis of the tax reform proposition.
3. The model
Consider N sovereign countries that run a …scal policy in order to balance their
public budget. Each country is assumed to have an exogenously …xed budget re-
4quirement Gi
5. Fiscal policies consist in per unit factor taxes levied according to
the source based principle. The economy is described as follows: two production
factors, capital K and labor L, are used in the production of a single consump-
tion good. The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and
is described by a homogeneous production function F(K;L): F(K;L) = Lf(k)
with k = K=L, f
0(k) > 0 and f
00(k) < 0. To spare conditions on positive pro-
duction and positive net remuneration of capital, we also assume that f
0(0) = 1,
f
0(1) = 0, f(0) = 0.
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r and w denoting respectively, the gross remuneration of capital and labor. The
relative factor demand of a particular …rm is given by:6










It is assumed that capital is perfectly mobile and labor perfectly immobile. As
taxes are levied according to the source based principle, the capital is invested in
the country giving the largest net remuneration. The following arbitrage condition
holds:
ri ¡ ti = rj ¡ tj = ½ 8i = 1::N
where ti is the per unit capital tax and ½ net capital remuneration on the inter-
national market.
Countries are assumed to be asymmetric with respect to their factor endow-
ment and we denote by ¹ Kw and ¹ Lw the world aggregate endowment of capital and
labor and ¸i > 0 and °i > 0; the shares of the aggregate endowment of owned by
country i;so that ¹ Li = ¸i¹ Lw and ¹ Ki = °i ¹ Kw. Note that
N P
1




For later use, we de…ne ki =
Ki
Li and kw = Kw
Lw :
At the Walrasian equilibrium, factor prices adjust to clear markets. A labor
market exists in each country and international markets are available for the cap-
ital and consumption goods. At equilibrium, labor markets clear in each country.
5We denote the country variables with a subscript i where i = 1:::N.
6Subscripts and dependent variables will be omitted when not absolutely necessary.
5The international capital market clearing condition is therefore given by
¹ Lw
X
¸iki(½;ti) = ¹ Kw:
As the LHS of this equation is strictly decreasing in ½; an equilibrium exists,















At equilibrium the level of capital invested in each country is
Ki(~ ½(t1;::;ti;::tn);ti) = ¸iLw~ ki(~ ½(t1;::;ti;::tn);ti)
Therefore, the existing equilibrium wage rate is given by






= ¡(e ½ti + 1)e ki < 0




e ki > 0
for i = 1:::N and j 6= i.
It is important to note that capital movements originate in two sources: the
di¤erence in factor endowments and the di¤erence in capital taxes. In the absence
of capital taxes, capital movements lead to an equalization of the invested capital
labor ratio across countries, i.e. to the e¢cient allocation of factors. Accordingly,
the liberalizing the capital market leads to a better allocation of resources, and
capital taxes introduce distortions in the capital market. When capital taxes are
not equalized across countries, part of the capital movements are not motivated
by allocative e¢ciency but by …scal opportunism.
4. Fiscal competition
In this section we analyze …scal competition arising between the di¤erent coun-
tries. Capital and labor taxes are assumed to be decided simultaneously by each
national social planner who maximizes the welfare of its representative consumer.
6Tax setting is described as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative game in which
strategies are tax levels and the payo¤s which are the countries representative
agent’s utility. First, we describe the public budget constraint and analyze for
each country the e¤ect of its national …scal policy on the welfare of its representa-
tive consumer. Then, we characterize a non-cooperative equilibrium of the game
we have just described.
4.1. The government budget constraint
In country i, a …xed amount of public money, Gi; hastobelevied through taxation.
The …scal choice lies in the allocation of the tax burden between labor and capital.
Taxes are per unit and source based7. The budget constraint of the government
in country i writes as:
Gi = ¸iLw(¿i + tiki)
with ¿i and ti denoting respectively, labor and capital taxes. Indeed, the …scal






It is important to note that the …scal choice consists in levying public money
through a non-distortionary tax instrument and/or a distortionary one. The labor
tax is non-distortionary as labor is inelastically supplied and immobile while the
capital tax distorts the international price of capital.
As no limits have been imposed on the tax instrument, it is possible to have
negative taxes at equilibrium.
4.2. The representative agent
In this part of the section, we isolate the di¤erent e¤ects of the capital tax on the
welfare of the representative agent of a particular country.
The representative agent in country i derives welfare from consumption of the
single good produced in the economy. His preferences can be represented by its
country’s per capita GNP, i.e. the value of the domestic product minus the net
contribution from abroad:
Ui = (riki + wi) ¡ ½(ki ¡ ¹ ki) (4.1)
where ¹ ki =
Ki
Li is the aggregate relative endowment of country i and ki =
Ki
Li is
the ratio of the factors of production e¤ectively invested in country i:
7We extend the analysis to the case where both source based and residency based taxes are
available to the government.
7The marginal e¤ect of capital tax can be decomposed into three e¤ects: the
terms of trade e¤ect, the tax import/export e¤ect and the capital movement e¤ect.




d(½(ki ¡ ¹ ki))
dti
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ki
+
d(ti(ki ¡ ¹ ki))
dti
+ (¹ ki ¡ ki):
The terms of trade e¤ect represents the gain (loss) that a capital importing
(exporting) country makes resulting from the depression of the international re-
muneration of capital induced by the increase of the capital tax. We call it the
terms of trade e¤ect as the logic behind it is exactly the one that justi…es the
optimum tari¤ in international trade : the tari¤ is seen as a way to in‡uence the
terms of trade. A country that imports capital has an incentive to increase its
capital tax in order to decrease its cost. On the contrary, a country that is capital
exporter should decrease it in order to increase its international remuneration.
The tax burden import/export e¤ect : When a capital importing country levies
atax on capital, not only resident ownerspay the tax but alsothe foreign investors.
Thismeansthat part of itstax burden issupported by non-residents, i.e. ti(ki¡¹ ki).
By increasing the capital tax level, a capital importing country in‡uences the size
of the tax burden that it exports. Up to a certain point this e¤ect is positive. For
a capital exporting country, the reverse is observed: each unit of exported capital
is not taxed at home and is then a loss of tax revenue.
The residual e¤ect of the …scal policy is due to the in‡uence of the induced
capital movement on the gross remuneration of factors. A higher ti decreases
invested capital and then changes gross factor remuneration. We call it the capital
movement e¤ect. This e¤ect is negative (res. positive) if the country is a capital




unit of capital invested at home increases a labor remuneration more than capital
remuneration when the country is a capital importer.
In order to spare tedious calculations, it is assumed that the utility functions
are continuous, strictly quasi-concave with respect to their capital tax rate and
that
@2Ui
@ti@tj ¸ 0: We present in the appendix an example satisfying all these as-
sumptions.
4.3. The non-cooperative …scal decision
It is now possible to describe formally a non-cooperative game played by the
di¤erent countries. It is a N player game whose players are the national social
planners and strategies the level of capital tax.
The payo¤s of the game are
8¼i(t1;:::;tN) = ki½(t1;::::;tN) + w(t1;:::;tN) + tiki(t1;:::;tN) (4.2)
8i = 1;:::;N. The strategies are
ti 2 [¡1;1] 8i = 1;:::;N: (4.3)
The best reply function of country i, e ti(t¡i) is implicitly de…ned by the F.O.C
of the maximization problem of its social planner:
(1 + ½ti)k
0
iti + (ki ¡ ki)½ti = 0; (4.4)

















This is to say that capital taxes are strategic complements. An equilibrium of the
non-cooperative game is given by the solution of the system of equations de…ned
by the N best-reply functions de…ned by (4.5).
Proposition 4.1. (i) The game de…ned by equations (4.2) and (4.3) has a non-
cooperative equilibrium (tnc
1 ;:::;tnc
N ). (ii) The equilibrium capital tax levels are
such that capital importing countries set positive capital taxes while capital ex-
porting countries subsidize it. (iii)Moreover, at equilibrium, the capital is almost
never e¢ciently allocated among countries.
Proof. : (ii) We know that, at equilibrium, countries are on their best-reply







: ti ¸ (<)0 when (ki ¡ ki) ￿ (>)0:
(i)Such game has an equilibrium when payo¤ functions are continuous and
quasi-concave and when the strategy sets are compact and convex. As the two
…rst conditions are assumptions of our model, we need to show that strategy
sets are convex and compact. As capital tax rates are unidimensional strategy
sets, we have to show that they are bounded from below and from above. The
demonstration is done by contradiction for the upper bound. Imagine that a
country, i; sets an in…nite tax at equilibrium, then ri = 1 and, by the assumptions
on the production function, ki = 0 and therefore the country is exporting capital.
This is impossible as we showed in (ii) that only capital importing countries set
9positive capital tax. Following a similar argument, it is easy to show that the
strategy sets are bounded from below.
(iii) The capital is e¢ciently allocated across countries when its cost is equal-
ized. As the cost is given by the international price of capital plus the national
capital tax rate, costs are equalized only when all countries set the same level of
capital tax. This is the case only when countries are symmetric.
Even if at a …rst sight, the result could seem surprising, proposition 4:1 is
rather intuitive when analyzed with the three e¤ects of capital taxation in mind.
When the capital tax is not too high, capital taxation has two positive e¤ects
on welfare for a capital importing country: a decrease in their capital import bill
via the terms-of-trade e¤ect and an alleviation of the tax burden via the tax
burden export e¤ect. Only the capital movement e¤ect bridles the capital
taxation willingness of these countries. Capital taxation has the opposite results
for a capital exporting country. They have a negative incentive to tax as they fear
a loss of their tax base and they want to get the highest return from the capital
they export.
Note here that the ine¢ciencies identi…ed in this proposition would not exist
if countries were symmetric in their relative capital endowment. In this latter
case, at equilibrium, capital is taxed in none of the countries and thus there
does not exist any ine¢ciency in the capital market. In this paper it is the
asymmetry between countries that causes ine¢ciency and not the factor elasticity
as in Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) or Huizinga and Nielsen (1996).
As at a non-cooperative equilibrium the allocation of capital is ine¢cient, it
makes sense to explore possible coordination devices.
5. Fiscal Reforms
We analyze in this section two tax reforms: the minimum tax reform and the tax
range reform.
For simplicity, we concentrate our analysis on cases where the equilibrium of
the non cooperative game is unique. For further references, label the countries
such that tnc
1 ￿ tnc
2 ::: ￿ tnc
N with tnc denoting the value of the taxes at the non-
cooperative equilibrium:
5.1. The minimum tax reform
The minimum tax reform is a natural candidate as a possible tax reform since it
has already been used to overcome ine¢ciencies arising from …scal competition
on the VAT in European Union.
10In this section, we argue that, under the assumptions of our model, this reform
cannot be accepted by all countries. The capital exporting countries reject it while
the capital importing countries advocate it. To show this we …rst have to derive
the Nash equilibrium of the game where the agents strategies are constrained from
below. We de…ne this game as the ”tax constrained game”. We then show that
any increase of the minimum tax level injures the capital exporting countries.
Strategies of this constrained game are all the capital tax levels larger than
the minimum tax level, ±; and the payo¤s, the welfare of the representative con-
sumer in each country. Let de…ne B( ±)as the set of countries bounded when the
minimum tax level is ± and ¯(±) the largest country index of B( ±).





i(±) = ± for i ￿ ¯(±) and
d~ tci(±)
d± > 0 for i > ¯(±).
Proof. As strategy sets are compact and convex and payo¤s are quasi-concave
and continuous functions, the equilibrium exists. The equilibrium taxes are in-
creasing functions of the minimum tax level because they are strategic comple-
ments as shown in (4.6).
This shows that for each level of the minimum tax rate, an equilibrium exists.
Let us now state the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2. The minimum tax reform is never unanimously accepted.
Proof. As a reform passes only if it is weakly preferred by all countries and
strictly preferred by at least one, it is enough to show that an increase of ± is
detrimental for at least one country. We do this for a non-constrained country.















































11This expression is negative (res. positive) when the country i exports (reps.
imports) capital. There is a con‡ict of interest between the capital importing
countries and the capital exporting ones. For completeness, we have to consider
the case where none of the capital exporting countries are unbounded. To see that
it is also detrimental for a bounded country, just note that this country is forced
to set a capital tax larger than its optimal one. This means that
dUi
dtc
















d± , by 5.1 it is straightforward that
dUi
d± < 0:
A rough intuition ofthisresult isthe following. Asit isforthe capital exporting
countries that the minimum tax could be binding, bounded countries have to give
up more of their tax base than they would like. This is detrimental for them and
positive for the capital importing countries that have the opportunity to export
more of their tax burden.
In our model, this means that if the European Union wants to pass this kind
of reform, capital exporting countries have to be compensated. Even if this is not
impossible, it is nevertheless interesting to …nd another tax reform that would be
self contained. This is what is developed in the next section.
5.2. The tax range reform
A tax range reform is de…ned as the imposition of a lower (±) and an upper (¹ ±)
limit to the capital tax level. The tax range is given by [±;¹ ±].
We show that there exist such tax reforms that are unanimously preferred
to the non-cooperative equilibrium. The success of this reform precisely comes
from the weakness of the former one. If it is detrimental for the capital exporting
countries to be bound from below and positive for the capital importing, it is
reasonable to expect the opposite e¤ect from an upper boundary. As both poli-
cies decrease the inter-country di¤erence in capital cost, it improves the capital
allocation e¢ciency. We can therefore expect a net gain from the combination of
these two reforms.
As for the minimum tax reform, we …rst compute the constrained Nash equi-
librium. We then show that it can be Pareto improving.
The constrained Nash equilibrium is de…ned by the game which strategies are
all the capital tax levels in the tax range, [±;¹ ±] and the payo¤s are the welfare of
each representative consumer.
For a given tax range, de…ne B(±;¹ ±) as the set of countries that are bounded
from below and T(±;¹ ±) as the set of countries bounded from the top.
Let also de…ne ¯(±;¹ ±) = 1+ max
i B(±;¹ ±) and µ(±;¹ ±) =min
i T(±;¹ ±) ¡ 1: ¯ is
then the index of the unbound country with the lowest capital tax and µ is the
index of the unbound country with the highest capital tax.
12Lemma 5.3. : This game has an equilibrium ( ~ tC
1;::: ~ tC
i;:: ~ tC
N), where ~ tC
i = ±
when i < ¯(±;¹ ±), ~ tC
i = ¹ ± for i ¸ µ(±;¹ ±) and ~ tC
i = ~ tC
i(±;¹ ±) when ¯(±;¹ ±) < i <
µ(±;¹ ±): Where
dtC
d± ¸ 0 and
dtC
d¹ ± ¸ 0.
Proof. By the usual argument, the existence of the equilibrium is ensured. As
capital taxes are strategic complements,
dtC
d± ¸ 0 and
dtC
d¹ ± ¸ 0:
Each tax range corresponds to a constrained Nash equilibrium. We now turn
to the analysis of impact of a tax range reform d±, d± on the welfare of the di¤erent
representative agents.
A country bounded from below, i.e. i < ¯, has the following welfare
function
Ui = ½ki + wi + ±ki







































d±)(ki ¡ ki + ±
:
ki): (5.3)
















d±)(ki ¡ ki + ±
:
ki). (5.4)
The welfare e¤ect of a tax range reform on an unbounded country is a little
more di¢cult to …nd.
The welfare of an unbounded country is given by
Ui = ½ki + wi + e t
C
i (±;±)ki
13Di¤erentiating with respect to both boundaries, we get
dUi
d±












with ± = ±;±:
The total e¤ect of the reform is then










It is now possible to show the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4. Tax range reforms that leave international remuneration of
capital unchanged and increase the elasticity of the international demand for





Moreover, as a result of the tax reform, all capital exporting countries increase
their capital tax and all capital importing ones decrease it.
Proof. From (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5), it directly follows that
when i < ¯;
dUi = ±
:
ki d± ¸ 0 as long as d± > 0 and ± ￿ 0;
and, when i > µ;
dUi = ±
:
ki d± ¸ 0 as long as d± < 0 and ± ¸ 0;
where the conditions on the boundaries and on the reforms are equivalent to
the one stated in the proposition;




As by setting ~ tC
i equal to its capital tax before the reform, unbounded coun-
triescan secure the before reformwelfare, if they change theirequilibriumstrategy,
it is for the better. This is to say that dUi > 0 and by the former equation that
dti ¸ (￿)0 when country i is capital exporter (importer)
This says that under these conditions, all countries are better o¤. The reform
then passes.
To complete the proof, we have to show that such reform exists and increases
the elasticity of the international demand for capital.
The intuition behind this result is the following.
14As ½ is unchanged, the term of trade e¤ect on welfare is neutralized. A tax
range reform is a mix between a minimum tax increase and a maximum tax
decrease. An increase of the minimum tax hurts capital exporting countries,
because of the tax burden e¤ect, as they are forced to give up more than they
would like of their tax base. This e¤ect is however attenuated by the increase of
theirgrossincomedescribed by the capital movement e¤ect. The capital importing
countries are a¤ected exactly in the opposite way. They are able to export more
of their tax burden but have to pay a tribute, the decrease of their gross income.
The decrease of the maximum tax a¤ects countries in exactly the opposite way.
The tax burden e¤ect is used as a built-in mechanism to transfer resources from
the country that gains to compensate the countries su¤ers. Capital exporting
countries bene…t from the e¢ciency gain and compensate the capital importing.
The e¢ciency gains are larger than the one directly created by the conver-
gence of the boundaries: there are gains due to the additional convergence of the
countries that are not bounded by the reform. This additional convergence is
explained by the increased elasticity of the international demand for capital: all
capital importing (exporting) countries have an incentive to increase (decrease)
their capital tax because the terms of trade e¤ect is augmented (On the welfare
point of view, the term of trade e¤ects are neutralized, but the marginal e¤ect of
capital tax described by the term of trade e¤ect is a¤ected). This induces a further
convergence of the capital taxes and thus an additional increase of e¢ciency.
In this proposition, the zero capital tax rate seems to be important, which is
not surprising since labor tax is non-distortionary. We can reasonably conjecture
that if labor supply were inelastic, a positive capital tax rate would play this role.
Both reforms have the appealing properties of being simple, anonymous and
respecting the subsidiary principle. By anonymous we mean that the minimum
tax or the range applies in the same way to all countries, i.e. it restricts their
strategy set. A non anonymous reform would impose a di¤erent tax level on each
country. In the context of our model it doesnot make a big di¤erence. A minimum
tax or tax range reform is mimicked by imposing to each country the capital tax
level that they would have announced under the minimum tax reform or the tax
range reform. An anonymous rule is desirable because: (i) The informational
requirement in imposing such reforms is lower, and (ii) a non anonymous reform
would be politically di¢cult to sustain.
The proposed reforms respect the subsidiary principle as they leave to the
national level the …scal decision while the supra-national interventions intend to
limit ine¢ciencies.
A more ambitious way of interpreting this work is to see it as an attempt to
design supra-national (for Europe) or federal (for Australia, Canada or the US)
institutions helping to avoid the ine¢ciencies linked to …scal competition.
15An institution consists in competencies and a decision rule. The competencies
would be the setting of the tax range. For the decision rule, we propose unanimity
rule as it prevails in the European Union on these matters or with the behavior of
independent countries in international negotiations. Some of the required features
of such institution would be precisely to respect the anonymity and the subsidiary
principles. For instance, the WTO, with its most preferred clause, imposes that
each country grant an equal treatment to all their trade partners.
6. Additional discussion
It is important to note that in this paper, the source based capital tax would be
used even if a residency base version would be at the disposition of the government.
The existence of a residency based tax would only enable the government to
reallocate part of the tax burden from the workers to the capital owners. The
source based capital tax would still be used as a strategic device.
We want to discuss the following extension: Imagine that the three tax in-
struments were available and that factor supplies are not perfectly inelastic (but
quite). The conclusions of our model would not be changed, the non-cooperative
equilibrium would consists in source based and residency based taxes and a la-
bor tax for each country. The source based capital tax wouldn’t have changed
as factor supply are quite inelastic. But the residual tax burden would be split
among the capital income and the labor residency based taxes to minimize the
distortions due to the factor supply elasticity.
Imagine now, that tax evasion is possible and is done at no risk. To evade
tax at no risk, a capital owner has to get the income of its capital from a non-
national institution. For instance, the Belgian capital owner gets its dividend
from a Luxembourg bank even though his capital is invested in Belgium. The
residency based tax would then be nil as it is not possible to implement it. In this
case, the introduction of a minimum withholding tax would please all countries as
it enables the government to use this instrument at least up to the minimum tax
level and therefore enable to decrease the ine¢ciencies linked to the factor supply
elasticity. Typically, the minimum withholding tax would be the lowest one from
set of the nationally preferred residency based capital without tax evasion.
The introduction of a minimum capital tax would pass without doubt. To
reach this conclusion, it has to be assumed that no pro…t is done by the banks
distributing the bene…ts and no risk are taken by the tax evaders. This is typically
not the case. This explains that we observe a certain level of residency based
capital tax in Europe and that countries that attract the most of these …nancial
bene…ts try to block this kind of reforms.
167. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed …scal competition between N asymmetric coun-
tries when international capital market is liberalized. We have concentrated our
analysis on the e¤ect of this competition on the allocation of capital among coun-
tries, i.e. on production e¢ciency. We decompose the impact of …scal policy in
three e¤ects: the terms of trade e¤ect, the tax import/export e¤ect and the capital
movement e¤ect.
We have shown that, when countries behave non-cooperatively, at equilibrium,
capital tax level di¤ers among countries leading to an ine¢cient allocation of
resources. We examined two tax reforms, one that imposes a minimum tax and
another that …xes a range in which capital tax levels have to be decided.
We showed that the …rst reform would not be unanimously accepted and that
the second reform passes as long as the convergence of tax limits is such that the
international remuneration of capital is not a¤ected. The N countries framework
is important here, as the e¤ects of the reforms di¤ers from countries that are
bounded and the one that are unbounded.
We argued that the tax range reform plus the unanimity rule could be an
interesting starting point for discussion of a supranational or federal …scal insti-
tution as it respects some appealing principles like the anonymity of the reforms
and the subsidiary principle.
This paper helps to identify how asymmetry between a large number of coun-
tries plays an important role in the …scal competition and what kind of reforms
could pass. In addition to that it allows for several interesting extensions on the
economical and institutional points of view.
8.
Appendix
In this appendix, considering a particular example, we show, with some lemmas,
that the analysis we undertook in this paper is not vain, i.e. we were not reasoning
on an empty set.
Consider the following constant returns to scale production function in inten-
sive form:
f(k) = (a ¡ bk)k
This function has been used by Bucovetsky and Grazzini and van Ypersele.
It perfectly …ts in the assumptions we impose except for two technical conditions
i.e. f0(0) = 1, f0(1) = 0. These conditions have to be replaced by ki <
a
2b°i; in




i < 0 and
d2Ui
dtjdti > 0:
Proof. Mutatis mutandis equation (4.4),
dUi
dti
= 2b¸i(kw ¡ ki) + °i
N X
j=1
¸jtj ¡ ti = 0 (0.1)





i ¡ 1) < 0 and
d2Ui
dtjdti = ¸j¸i > 0.
Lemma 0.2. The non-cooperative equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. The Nash equilibrium solves the system of equations de…ned by (0.1)





















A foralli = 1:::N
Lemma 0.3. For all tax range [±;±]; an equilibrium of the constrained game
exists and is unique.
Proof. The equilibrium of the constrained game solves the system of equations
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i = ± for all i < ¯ and t
C
i = ± for all i > µ:
Lemma 0.4. There exists at least one pair of countries (i;j) such that sign(1 +
Pµ
l=¯ ½tlªl ¡ ½tiªi)(ki ¡ ki) 6= sign(1 +
Pµ
l=¯ ½tlªl ¡½tjªj)(kj ¡ kj):
Proof. To prove this we …rst compute ªi and show that 1 +
Pµ
l=¯ ½tlªl ¡ ½tiªi
has the same sign for all countries which is a su¢cient condition for the statement






















It is now possible to check if 1 +
Pµ

































8This is a su¢cient condition to ensure that there exist at least one pair of countries (i;j)
such that sign(1 +
Pµ
l=¯ ½tlªl ¡ ½tiªi)(ki ¡ ki) 6=sign(1 +
Pµ
l=¯ ½tlªl ¡ ½tjªj)(kj ¡ kj):
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